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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, there were nearly 40,000 firearm-related deaths in the
United States, including homicides, suicides, accidents, and deaths of
undetermined intent.' Since then, firearm deaths have declined by
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1. See Sherry L. Murphy, Deaths: Final Data for 1998, 48 NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS REP. 66,
71 (2000) (reporting 39,595 firearm-related deaths in 1993).
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more than twenty-two percent.2 Nevertheless, in 1998 (the most re-
cent year for which data are available), there remained more than
30,000 deaths in the United States associated with firearms.3
Between 1993 and 1998, many different interventions intended to
address gun violence were implemented. These interventions in-
cluded federal and state legislation, new police practices, community-
based initiatives, and educational efforts.4
Two categories of intervention, however, have yet to be widely
implemented. Unlike virtually all other consumer products, the safe
design of firearms is largely unregulated.5 At the federal level, fire-
arms are specifically excluded from the jurisdiction of the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC),6 the federal agency with the au-
thority to regulate the safety of most other consumer products.7 This
can lead to rather ironic results, as when the CPSC announces a recall
to protect consumers from defective firearm trigger locks (which are
within its purview), but is powerless to address potentially defective
firearms themselves.8
Also largely absent from the firearm policy arena in recent years
have been laws enacted by municipalities within a state. Beginning in
the early 1980s, the National Rifle Association (NRA) explicitly sought
to convince state legislatures to enact firearm preemption laws.9 To-
day, more than forty states preempt localities from enacting some or
all types of their own firearm laws.' °
Forbidden to implement most kinds of legislation, and in the ab-
sence of comprehensive federal laws, recently municipalities have
2. See id.
3. See id. at 67 (reporting 30,708 firearm related deaths in 1998).
4. See Garen J. Wintemute, The Future of Firearm Violence Prevention: Building on Success,
282 JAMA 475, 475-77 (1999).
5. SeeJon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, A Public Health Approach to Regulating Firearms
as Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1193, 1196 (2000).
6. See Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-284, § 30(e), 90 Stat. 503, 504 (1976), (stating, "[t]he Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission shall make no ruling or order that restricts the manufacture or sale of firearms,
firearms ammunition, or components of firearms ammunition, including black powder or
gunpowder for firearms").
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (2000) (defining CPSC's jurisdiction over "consumer
products").
8. See Master Lock to Recall Over 750,000 Gun Locks, REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, July 25,
2000, available in 2000 WL 24357314.
9. See Stephen P. Teret et al., Gun Deaths and Home Rule: A Case for Local Regulation of a
Local Public Health Problem, 9 (Supp. 1) AM.J. PREY. MED. 44, 45 (1993).
10. SeeJon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, New Courtroom Strategies Regarding Firearms:
Tort Litigation Against Firearm Manufacturers and Constitutional Challenges to Gun Laws, 36
Hous. L. REv. 1713, 1730 (1999).
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sought a new approach - litigation against the firearm industry. In
general, these lawsuits allege that firearm manufacturers and dealers
are liable to the municipality for costs associated with firearm vio-
lence. " In part, this strategy is based on the theory that litigation can
serve a public health purpose. In addition to compensating the in-
jured victim (in this case the city), public health professionals argue
that litigation can encourage manufacturers of a potentially danger-
ous product, like firearms, to manufacture and market that product in
ways likely to reduce the risk of injury.' 2
Although some have criticized the municipal lawsuits against the
gun industry as usurping legislative prerogatives, state and even fed-
eral legislators have been far from silent on the issue. Mirroring its
legislative strategy regarding preemption laws, the NRA has led the
lobbying effort in state legislatures for the enactment of laws to pre-
vent municipalities from suing the firearm industry.1" To date, these
so-called firearm "immunity laws" have been enacted in nineteen
states; bills are pending in several others."
Firearm immunity laws have the potential to interfere with the
ability of litigation to serve a public health purpose. Indeed, a careful
analysis of the immunity laws thus far enacted yields some surprising
results. Several of these laws forbid a very broad array of causes of
action, purport to retroactively bar lawsuits filed prior to their enact-
ment, or apply even to actions brought by private citizens. However, a
close reading also demonstrates that, in some states, municipalities
may retain viable causes of action despite the immunity laws. And the
states generally seen as most receptive to litigation against the firearm
industry have not yet enacted such laws. On balance, therefore, we
believe that firearm immunity laws represent a formidable, but not
insurmountable, obstacle to a more general litigation strategy.
In Part II, this article will describe the municipal litigation thus
far brought against the firearm industry, including the relevant causes
11. See id. at 1713, 1745-52; see also David Kairys, Legal Claims of Cities Against Manufactur-
ers of Handguns, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 1 (1998).
12. See Stephen P. Teret, Litigating For the Public's Health, 76 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 1027
(1986).
13. See Junk Lawsuits Against Gun Manufacturers (visited July 13, 2000) <http://www.
nraila.org/research/19990825-LawsuitPreemption-001.shtml>. In its Fact Sheet dated Feb.
24, 2000, the NRA position is set forth:
State legislatures across the nation are recognizing that these suits are an attempt
at backdoor gun control, and usurp the legislature's power. Lawmakers are react-
ing by prohibiting cities from filing these suits. Since the first suit was introduced,
14 states have enacted NRA-backed legislation that does just that ... and more
states will soon follow.
14. See infra notes 62-127 and accompanying text.
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of action. 5 In addition, it briefly notes similarities between municipal
and recent private lawsuits in order to provide relevant background
information. 6 Part III reviews the state immunity legislation. 17 Spe-
cifically, section A notes the basic provisions shared by many of these
laws;' 8 section B discusses variations among the immunity laws in the
specific causes of action that are affected;' 9 section C describes the
laws' effects on private (notjust municipal) lawsuits; 2° section D exam-
ines efforts by some states to apply their immunity laws retroactively to
pending litigation;2' and section E highlights several interesting or
unusual provisions of some of the laws.22 Part IV discusses possible
future developments in this area: analyzing immunity bills proposed
in several states, and noting possible grounds for constitutional chal-
lenges to these laws.23
II. MUNICIPAL AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS
A. Municipal Lawsuits
Since October 30, 1998, when New Orleans became the first city
to sue the gun industry, thirty-one other cities and counties,24 includ-
ing Atlanta, Chicago, the District of Columbia, Los Angeles, New York
15. See infra notes 24-47 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 62-119 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 72-89 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 112-119 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 120-140 and accompanying text.
24. As of November 2000, the city and county plaintiffs include the following munici-
palities: Alameda County, CA (filed 5/25/99), Atlanta, GA (filed 2/4/99), Berkeley, CA
(filed 5/25/99), Boston, MA (filed 6/3/99), Bridgeport, CT (filed 1/27/99), Camden
City, NJ (filed 6/21/99), Camden County, NJ (filed 6/1/99), Chicago, IL (filed 11/12/
98), Cincinnati, OH (filed 4/28/99), Cleveland, OH (filed 4/8/99), Compton, CA (filed
5/25/99), Cook County, IL (filed 11/12/98), Detroit, MI (filed 4/26/99), District of Co-
lumbia (filed 1/20/00), East Palo Alto, CA (filed 5/25/99), Gary, IN (filed 8/27/99),
Inglewood, CA (joined Los Angeles suit on 7/16/99), Los Angeles, CA (filed 5/25/99),
Los Angeles County, CA (filed 8/6/99), Miami-Dade County, FL (filed 1/27/99), Newark,
NJ (filed 6/9/99), New Orleans, LA (filed 10/30/98), New York City, NY (filed 6/20/00),
Oakland, CA (filed 5/25/99), Philadelphia, PA (filed 4/11/00), Sacramento, CA (filed 5/
25/99), San Francisco, CA (filed 5/25/99), San Mateo County, CA (filed 5/25/99), St.
Louis, MO (filed 4/30/99), Wayne County, MI (filed 4/26/99), West Hollywood, CA (filed
5/25/99), and Wilmington, DE (filed 9/29/99).
Although a total of thirty-two municipalities have filed suit filed against gun manufac-
turers, wholesalers/distributors, dealers, trade associations, and others in both state and
federal courts, there are only twenty-two separate suits because some of the municipalities
filed joint complaints. Specifically, the Los Angeles suit includes Compton, West
Hollywood, and Inglewood; the San Francisco suit includes Alameda County, Berkeley,
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City, and Philadelphia, have followed its lead. On June 26, 2000, New
York became the first state to file suit.2
5
The municipalities raise a variety of causes of action in their com-
plaints. Public nuisance, 26 products liability (including defective or
negligent design 27 and failure to warn 28 ), and negligent marketing
and distribution 29 are common. Other causes of action such as civil
conspiracy, 3° unjust enrichment," and fraud 32 have also been raised.
In its Second Amended Complaint, Camden County provides an
example of allegations commonly raised in a public nuisance cause of
action:
91. Defendants' conduct - their policies and practices
for marketing and distribution of handguns . . . - has know-
East Palo Alto, Oakland, Sacramento, and San Mateo County; and the Chicago suit in-
cludes Cook County.
25. See People of the State of New York v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., No. 402-586-2000 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. filed June 26, 2000); see also New York Joins the Gun Suits, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2000,
at A26.
26. See, e.g., Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No.
99cv-2518, 91-102, at 34-37 (D.N.J. filed Jan. 6, 2000); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., No. 98 CH 015596, 99 83-97, at 78-82 (Cook County Cir. Ct. filed Mar. 27, 2000);
Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-912658, 1 101-107, at 36-37 (Wayne County Cir. Ct.
filed Apr. 26, 1999); District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 00CA428, 99 88-94 at
26-27) (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 20, 2000), People v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, No. BC
210894, 9J 142-150, at 34-36 (Sup. Ct. Cal. filedJuly 16, 1999);James v. Arcadia Machine &
Tool, No. L-6059-99, 9 132-147 at 27-29 (Essex County Super. Ct. filed June 8, 1999);
People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., No. 402-586-2000, 63-66 at 18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filedJune
26, 2000); City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No.00-04-01-442, 99 81-94, at 27-31
(Ct. C.P. Phila., filed Apr. 11, 2000) (moved to U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Eastern Dist. of Pa. on
May 12, 2000, No. 2000-2463); City of St. Louis v. Cernicek, No. 992-01209, 9 73-82 (St.
Louis Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 9, 1999); Sills v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99c-09-283-FSS, 79-
96, at 21-24 (Del. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 9, 1999).
27. See, e.g., City of Atlanta v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No.99VS0149217J, 7 76-85, 18-20
(Fulton County Ct. filed Feb. 4, 1999); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No.SUCV
99-2590, 9 90-98, at 25-27 (Suffolk County Super. Ct. filed June 26, 2000); White v. HI-
Point Firearms, No. 381897, 9J 52-63, at 18-21 (Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga County filed Apr. 8,
1999);James, 99 99-108, at 20-22; City of New York v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. CV003641, 7
112-114, at 22 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 20, 2000).
28. See, e.g., City of Camden v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. L-451099, 7 109-114, at 28-29
(Camden County Super. Ct. filedJune 21, 1999); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
No. A9902369, 1 94-99, at 30-31 (Ct. C.P. Hamilton County filed Apr. 28, 1999); White, 9
70-74, at 21-22; Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 98-18578, 16, at 14-15 (Orleans
Parish Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 30, 1998); City of Newo York, 77 115-117, at 22-23; Sills, 9J 67-70, at
17-18.
29. See, e.g., City of Atlanta, It 132-136, at 7-9; City of Boston, 71 85-89, at 24-25; City of
Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No.45D02-9908-CT355, 9J 76-80, at 29-30 (Lake Super. Ct.
filed Aug. 27, 1999); Sills, 1 74-78, at 19-20.
30. See, e.g., City of St. Louis, 99 83-94; Sills, 106-108, at 15-26.
31. See, e.g., White, 9 75-78, at 22-23; James, 9 148-157, at 29-30.
32. See, e.g., City of Atlanta, 17 114-121, 4-5; City of Cincinnati, 79 135-142, at 37-38.
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ingly created, contributed to and maintained an unreasona-
ble interference with rights common to the general public
which is and constitutes a public nuisance under New Jersey
Law.
92. Defendants' unrestrained conduct maximizes sales
of their lethal products, without any check or precaution, by
knowingly establishing, supplying and maintaining an over-
saturated handgun market that facilitates easy access for
criminal purposes, including access by underage youths and
other persons prohibited to purchase or possess handguns
under state or federal law. Defendants have full knowledge
that their policies and practices will and regularly do result
in substantially increased levels of handgun deaths and inju-
ries and handgun use in crime in Camden County, and that
their conduct has a continuing, substantially detrimental ef-
fect on the County.33
Boston's First Amended Complaint illustrates a cause of action based
on defective design:
Defendants breached their implied warranties of
merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose with
respect to their firearms because those firearms were unrea-
sonably dangerous. Yet defendants failed to incorporate fea-
sible alternative designs to their products which would have
reduced, if not prevented, injury to [plaintiffs]. ..... "
According to Boston, the defendants should have included such
safety features as: "devices that prevent the products from being fired
by unauthorized users;" 5 "devices that alert users that a round is in
the chamber; 31 6 and "devices that prevent these products from being
fired when the magazine is removed." 7
Finally, in its cause of action based on "negligent marketing and
distribution," New York City alleges that "[d] efendants have a duty to
the public and to the plaintiffs to use reasonable care in the market-
33. Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No 99cv-2518,
91- 92, at 34 (D.N.J. filed Jan. 6, 2000).
34. City of Boston, 94 at 26.
35. Id., 94(a) at 26. For a discussion of these firearms - known as personalized guns
- see also, Stephen P. Teret et al., Making Guns Safer, ISSUES IN Sci. & TECH. 37, 38 (Sum-
mer 1998).
36. City of Boston, 9 4 (c) at 26. For a discussion of these devices - known as loaded
chamber indicators - see also, Jon S. Vernick et al., I Didn't Know the Gun Was Loaded: An
Examination of Two Safety Devices That Can Reduce the Risk of Unintentional Firearm Deaths, 20 J.
OF PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 427, 428 (Winter 1999).
37. City of Boston, 94(d) at 26. For a discussion of these devices - known as magazine
safeties - see also, Vernick, supra note 36, at 428.
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ing, distributing and selling of their lethal products so as to reduce
the risks of their guns being used inappropriately."" s
All of the municipal suits are in the pre-trial phase of litigation,
but are progressing at different rates. As of September 2000, courts
have ruled on defendants' motions to dismiss or their equivalent in
ten decisions, involving twenty-three cities and counties.39 In four de-
cisions involving five cities-Bridgeport,40 Cincinnati, 41 Miami-Dade
County,4 2 and Chicago and Cook County4 3-the courts granted de-
fendants' motions in full, and the suits have been dismissed. In all
instances, the municipalities have appealed those decisions. In six
other decisions involving eighteen municipalities, however, the courts
denied defendants' motions to dismiss, either in full or in part, al-
lowing the cases to proceed. Specifically, defendants' motions to dis-
miss were denied in their entirety in the suits brought by New
Orleans,44 Cleveland,45 and twelve California cities.46 The courts de-
nied the motions to dismiss in part in the suits filed by Atlanta, Bos-
ton, and Detroit (with Wayne County), allowing some or most of the
causes of action to proceed.47
38. City of New York v. Arms Tech., Inc., CV003641, 105 at 24 (D.N.Y. filed June 20,
2000).
39. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
40. Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. x06-cv-99-01531988, (Conn. Super. Ct.) (or-
der dated Dec. 10, 1999).
41. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A9902369, (Ct. C.P. Hamilton
County) (order dated Oct. 7, 1999), affd, City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. (Ohio
Ct. App.) (Aug. 11, 2000).
42. Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-01941 CA-06, (Miami-Dade County Cir. Ct.)
(order dated Dec. 13, 1999).
43. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98CH15596 (Cook County Cir. Ct.)
(order dated Sept. 15, 2000).
44. Morial v. Smith & Wesson, Corp., No. 98-18578, (Orleans Parish Dist. Ct.) (order
dated Feb. 28, 2000).
45. White v. Smith & Wesson, No. 99 CV 1134 (N.D. Ohio) (order dated Mar. 14,
2000).
46. State v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, No. 4095 (San Diego County Super. Ct.) (order
dated Sept. 15, 2000).
47. The State Court of Fulton County dismissed Atlanta's strict product liability claims,
but denied the defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to the negligence claims. See
City of Atlanta v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99VS0149217J (Fulton County Ct.) (order
dated Oct. 27, 1999). On May 16, 2000, the Wayne County Circuit Court dismissed De-
troit's and Wayne County's negligence claims, but denied the defendants' motion for sum-
mary disposition with respect to public nuisance. See Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-
912658 NZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct.) (order dated May 16, 2000). On July 13, 2000, the
Superior Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, denied defendants' motion to dismiss
with respect to all counts but one duplicative count concerning negligent distribution and
marketing. See City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. SUCV 99-2590 (Suffolk
County Super. Ct.) (order dated July 13, 2000).
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B. Private Lawsuits
In addition to these municipal lawsuits, several individuals and
private organizations have also filed suits against the gun industry
based on similar legal theories. For example, the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Spinal Cord
Injury Association have filed two complementary suits, one against
gun manufacturers and the other against gun wholesalers and distrib-
utors, employing a theory of negligent marketing and distribution.4 8
In Dix v. Beretta,49 the parents of a fifteen year-old unintentionally
shot by his 14-year-old friend brought a products liability case against
Beretta." Plaintiffs claimed, in part, that the gun used to kill their
son was defective because it lacked an adequate loaded chamber indi-
cator which would have alerted the user that a round was still in the
chamber of the gun.5 1
In addition, at least one individual lawsuit has employed a nui-
sance theory. The families of Michael Ceriale, Andrew Young, and
Salada Smith filed separate suits against various gun manufacturers,
distributors and retail sellers in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois for the shooting deaths of the decedents.5 2 Each of these suits
raised a public nuisance cause of action, alleging that defendants
"have created and maintained a channel of firearm distribution
through which thousands of guns have been funneled to children in
the City of Chicago."5" In all three cases, Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss with respect to the nuisance claims, which the court rejected
in a consolidated opinion.54
48. See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. A-A. Arms, Inc.,
99CV3999, (D.N.Y. filed Oct. 5, 1999) (original complaint filed July 16, 1999); NAACP v.
Acusport Corp., 99 CV 7037 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 29, 1999).
49. No. 750681-9 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 15, 1998).
50. See id.
51. On Nov. 16, 1998, the jury, by a vote of nine to three; found for Beretta. The Dixes
filed a motion for a new trial, claiming juror misconduct, which the trial court judge re-
jected on January 15, 1999. On June 28, 2000, however, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
ordered the trial judge to examine possible bias by one of the jurors. On September 8,
2000, a new trial was granted. See Henry K. Lee, Case Against Gunmaker Gets New Tria, S. F.
CHRON., Sept. 12, 2000, at A17.
52. See Ceriale v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99 L 5628 (Cook County Cir. Ct. 1999);
Smith v. Bryco Arms, No. 99 L 13465 (Cook County Cir. Ct. 1999); Young v. Bryco Arms,
No. 98 L 6684 (Cook County Cir. Ct. 1999).
53. Ceriale Complaint, supra note 51, 46; Smith Complaint, supra note 51, 52,
Young Complaint, supra note 51, 48.
54. See Ceriale (order dated Nov. 30, 1999); Smith (order dated Nov. 30, 1999); Young
(order dated Nov. 30, 1999).
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Perhaps the best known private suit is Hamilton v. Accu-Tek 5 5 -the
first case using a negligent marketing theory to hold some gun manu-
facturers liable for not taking certain steps to make it harder for their
products to reach unauthorized users like juveniles or criminals.5 6 In
Hamilton, the relatives of six people killed by handguns, along with an
injured survivor and his mother, sued twenty-five handgun manufac-
turers for negligence, claiming that the manufacturers' marketing and
distribution practices contributed to the illegal market for hand-
guns.5 7 On February 11, 1999, the jury found fifteen of the defend-
ants negligent,5" nine of which were found to have proximately
caused the injury to one or more plaintiffs.5 9
At the end of the trial, Defendants moved for judgment as a mat-
ter of law.6 ° In his opinion denying defendant's motion, Senior
United States District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein held that "it is
the duty of manufacturers of a uniquely hazardous product, designed
to kill and wound human beings, to take reasonable steps available at
the point of their sale to primary distributors to reduce the possibility
that these instruments will fall into the hands of those likely to misuse
them."'" The case is now before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
III. FiREARm IMMUNITY LAWS
On February 9, 1999, Georgia became the first state to enact a
firearm immunity law.62 Just eighteen months later, as of August 1,
2000, nineteen states had enacted laws specifically designed to affect
the ability of municipalities to bring litigation against the firearm in-
dustry. These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colo-
rado, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana,
Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
55. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
56. See id. at 825.
57. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
58. Id. at 811.
59. Ultimately, the jury awarded damages to only one plaintiff, Stephen Fox and his
mother, apportioning liability among just 3 manufacturers. See id. at 824.
60. See id. at 825.
61. Id.
62. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184 (2000).
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Utah, and Virginia.63 Bills have also been introduced or proposed in
several other states64 and in Congress.65
A. Basic Provisions
Many of these state immunity laws employ very similar, core lan-
guage. For example, the full text of Maine's law is as follows:
A municipality may not commence a civil action against any
firearm or ammunition manufacturer for damages, abate-
ment or injunctive relief resulting from or relating to the
lawful design, manufacture, marketing or sale of firearms or
ammunition to the public. This section does not prohibit a
municipality from bringing an action against a firearm or
ammunition manufacturer or dealer for breach of contract
or warranty for firearms or ammunition purchased by a
municipality.66
Many other states have employed this same two-part structure: 1)
prohibiting lawsuits by local governments against firearm manufactur-
ers; and 2) providing an exception for causes of action based on
breach of contract or warranty for guns purchased by the local govern-
ment.67 The exception might apply where, for example, a local gov-
ernment had contracted with a manufacturer to provide handguns for
its police force. If the guns were not as ordered, or were otherwise
unfit for their intended use, the locality would still have the ability to
bring an appropriate action against the manufacturer.68
63. 2000 Ala. Acts 762 § (1)(c); ALAsKA STAT. § 09.65.155 (Michie 1999); A~iz. REv.
STAT. § 12-714 (1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-16-504(b) (2) (Michie 1999); H.B. 1208, 62d
Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184(b) (2) (1999); H.B.
15, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1797.1 (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN
tit. 30 § 2005 (1999); 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 265; MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-115 (1999); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.107 (Michie 1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1289.24a (1999); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6120 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 21-58-1, § 21-58-2, § 21-58-3, § 21-58-4
(Michie 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1314 (b)-(d) (1999); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 128.001 (West 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-64 (2000); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.2-915.1 (Michie 2000).
64. See infra notes 120-27.
65. See Firearms Heritage Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1032, 106th Cong. (1999).
66. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 2005 (1999).
67. States which, in part, incorporate this language or some variation include: Alabama
(2000 Ala. Acts 762); Georgia (GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-11-184(b) (2) (1999)); Kentucky (H.B.
15, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2000)); Louisiana (LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1799(B) (West 1999));
Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 2005); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.107(2)
(Michie 1999)); Pennsylvania (18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6120(A.1) (2) (1999)); Tennes-
see (TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-17-1314(c)(2) (1999)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-
64(A)(2) (2000)); and Virginia (2000 Va. H.B. 905, to be codified as VA. CODE. ANN.
§ 15.2-915.1).
68. See supra text accompanying note 66.
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In some states that employ this basic language, however, there are
modest variations in the parties to be protected from a municipal law-
suit. For example, in the Maine law, only firearm or ammunition
manufacturers are protected.6" But in Georgia, firearm trade associa-
tions and dealers are also immune from suit.7" And in Virginia, pro-
tection is further extended to firearm marketers and distributors.
71
B. Causes of Action Effected
Several of the immunity statutes prohibit the plaintiffs from
bringing specific causes of action, many of which have been raised in
the complaints filed by the municipalities. By comparison, several of
the statutes expressly permit certain causes of action, affording new
municipalities and/or individuals the opportunity to file suit.
For example, the Georgia immunity statute provides: "The Gen-
eral Assembly further declares that the lawful design, marketing, man-
ufacturing, or sale of firearms or ammunition to the public is not
unreasonably dangerous activity and does not constitute a nuisance per se."72
Immunity laws in Tennessee and Oklahoma have nearly identical lan-
guage.73 Many of the complaints in the municipal suits specifically
allege that the defendants' activities are "unreasonably dangerous 74
or that they create a nuisance.75 In Atlanta's Complaint, for example,
it alleges: "at the time the guns were manufactured, and at the time
they left the control of Defendants, the guns were unreasonably danger-
ous. .. "76 Similarly, Atlanta also alleges that "Defendants' conduct
constitutes a nuisance as thousands of the firearms produced by De-
fendants will be illegally trafficked into Atlanta, illegally possessed and
69. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 2005 (1999).
70. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184 (b)(2) (1999).
71. SeeVa. H.B. 905 § 1, amending VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-915.1 (Michie 2000).
72. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184(a) (2) (1999) (emphasis added).
73. See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-17-1314(b) (1999). Oklahoma's immunity statute ap-
pears to provide even more protection to the gun industry by prohibiting actions based on
"nuisance" rather than "nuisance per se." See OKL. ST. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.24(a) (West
1999).
74. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, 94, at 26, City of Boston v.
Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99-2590 (Suffolk County Super. Ct. filed June 26, 2000); Com-
plaint, 53, at 18; 65, at 20; 71, at 21, White v. HI-Point Firearms, No. 381897 (Ct. C.P.
Cuyahoga County filed Oct. 30, 1999); Complaint, 4 12, 13, 24, 25, Morial v. Smith &
Wesson Corp., No. 98-18578 (Orleans Parish Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 30, 1998); Complaint,
113, 115, at 22, City of New York v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. CV 00 3641 (E.D.N.Y. filed June
20, 2000).
75. See supra note 26.
76. Complaint, 94, at 22, City of Atlanta v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99VS0149217J
(Fulton County Ct. filed Feb. 4, 1999) (emphasis added).
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illegally used in Atlanta and will remain illegally in the hands of per-
sons until the illegal possession of these firearms is detected."77
Michigan's immunity statute also appears to have been tailored to
the complaints filed by various municipalities, expressly prohibiting,
in part, actions based on a manufacturer's "[f]ailure to sell with or
incorporate into the product a device or mechanism to prevent a fire-
arm or ammunition from being discharged by an unauthorized per-
son unless specifically provided for by contract. ' 7s Many of the
municipalities have raised causes of actions based on failure to incor-
porate safety devices preventing unauthorized users from operating
the firearms.79
Under Colorado's immunity statute almost all tort actions against
the gun industry are prohibited, except for certain products liability
actions: "a person or other public or private entity may not bring an
action in tort, other than a product liability action, against a firearms or
ammunition manufacturer, importer, or dealer for any remedy arising
from physical or emotional injury, physical damage, or death caused
by the discharge of a firearm or ammunition. 8°
Some state immunity laws, however, specifically protect certain
causes of action. Under South Dakota's immunity legislation, several
causes of action are still available to potential plaintiffs, including:
actions for deceit, breach of contract, or expressed or im-
plied warranties, or for injuries resulting from failure of fire-
arms to operate in a normal or usual manner due to defects
or negligence in design or manufacturer. . . [or] to actions
arising from the unlawful sale or transfer of firearms, or to
instances where the transferor knew, or should have known,
that the recipient would engage in the unlawful sale or trans-
fer of the firearm, or would use, or purposely allow the use
of, the firearm in an unlawful, negligent, or improper
fashion.81
77. Plaintiffs First Amendment to Complaint, 107, at 2 (filed Sept. 15, 1999).
78. 1999 MICH. PUB. Acrs § 15 (11).
79. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying discussion.
80. H.B.1208, 62d Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2000) (to be codified at COL
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-504.5(A)(1)) (emphasis added). Colorado's immunity statute,
however, does exempt certain actions from its purview: "a firearms or ammunition manu-
facturer, importer, or dealer may be sued in tort for any damages proximately caused by an
act of the manufacturer, importer, or dealer in violation of a state or federal statute or
regulation." H.B. 1208. In such actions, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant vio-
lated the state or federal statute or regulation by clear and convincing evidence. Id. This
exception, however, does not exempt the common law theories of liability raised by the
municipalities.
81. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 21-58-4 (Michie 2000).
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Accordingly, South Dakota's immunity law does not extend to a
cause of action for negligent design or manufacture, a claim raised in
several of the municipal suits.8 2 In addition, actions based on deceit
are still permitted."
Similarly, Alaska's immunity statute permits a cause of action
based on negligent design.8 4 And Virginia's immunity statute ex-
empts, inter alia, "an action for injuries resulting from negligence."85
Many of the complaints filed by the municipalities raise negligence
claims, including negligent marketing and distribution.86
Texas' immunity statute, in addition to exempting the standard
breach of contract or warranty action for guns bought by municipali-
ties,87 also exempts: "damage or harm to property owned or leased by
the governmental unit caused by a defective firearm or ammunition;
personal injury or death, if such action arises from a governmental
unit's claim for subrogation; s" injunctive relief to enforce a valid ordi-
nance, statute, or regulation; or contribution under Chapter 33, Civil
Practices and Remedies."8 9 None of these exemptions appear to ap-
ply to the type of municipal suits filed so far.
C. Effect on Private Lawsuits
In addition to affecting municipal lawsuits, the imriiunity laws of
three states-Alaska, Colorado, and South Dakota-also explicitly bar
some or all lawsuits that might be brought by individuals. With recent
victories for the plaintiffs in some private lawsuits,90 extending the
82. For municipal suits alleging negligent design, see supra note 27.
83. See supra text accompanying note 81.
84. Alaska's statute provides that although civil suits may not be based "on the lawful
sale, manufacture, or design of firearms or ammunition," the immunity "does not prohibit
a civil action resulting from a negligent design, a manufacturing defect, a breach of contract,
or a breach of warranty." ALsKA STAT. § 09.65.155 (Michie 1999) (emphasis added).
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-915.1 (Michie 2000). This portion of the statute states in its
entirety:
This section shall not prohibit (i) a locality from bringing an action against a
firearms or ammunition marketer, manufacturer, distributor, dealer, seller, or
trade association for breach of contract or warranty or negligence as to firearms
or ammunition purchased by the locality or (ii) an action for injuries resulting
from negligence or breach of warranty or contract.
Id.
86. For municipal suits alleging negligent marketing or distribution, see supra note 29.
87. See notes 66-71 and accompanying text, for a discussion of this "standard" language.
88. Texas recognizes two types of subrogation: conventional, which arises by contract,
and legal, which arises by operation of law or in equity to prevent injustice. See In re Texas
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Assoc., 989 S.W.2d 880, 885 (Tex. App. 1999); Dickey v. Healthcare
Recoveries, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 425, *7-*8 (Tex. App. 1998).
89. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 128.001(d) (1-5) (West 1999).
90. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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firearm industry's protection to these suits as well may represent a fu-
ture trend.
Alaska's law provides that civil actions may not be brought "if the
action is based on the lawful sale, manufacture, or design of firearms
or ammunition," and is not limited to municipalities."' Specifically
excepted from Alaska's immunity law are actions resulting from "a
negligent design, a manufacturing defect, a breach of contract, or a
breach of warranty."92 Under this language, an individual lawsuit like
the Dix case (based on negligent design) would not be prohibited, but
one like Hamilton (based on negligent marketing) would be.93
In Colorado, the lawsuit prohibitions explicitly apply to "a person
or other public or private entity."94 In South Dakota, firearm manu-
facturers, distributors, and sellers are immune from liability to "any
person or entity . .. for any injury suffered, including wrongful death
and property damage, because of the use of [a] firearm by another."9
This seems to suggest that if the injury is self-inflicted, whether acci-
dentally or intentionally, the victim might retain a cause of action.
By comparison, two states specifically exclude lawsuits brought by
individuals from the reach of their immunity law. Oklahoma's law
provides that it "shall not be construed to prohibit an individual from
bringing a cause of action based upon an existing recognized theory
of law."96 In Tennessee, individual lawsuits based on breach of con-
tract, breach of warranty, or defective manufacture are protected. 97
The Tennessee law further (and perhaps redundantly) assures that
the protections afforded the firearm industry "shall not apply in any
litigation brought by an individual . "..."98 It is unclear whether, even
in the majority of states that do not specifically affect individual law-
suits, firearm industry defendants will nevertheless attempt to invoke
the immunity laws as a shield against liability in private actions.
D. Effect on Pending Lawsuits
The immunity legislation enacted in at least four states-Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, and Michigan-purports to apply to pending
lawsuits. If given effect, the legislation could provide a basis for dis-
91. ALAsKA STAT. § 09-65.155 (Michie 2000).
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
94. H.B. 1208, 62d Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2000).
95. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 21-58-2 (Michie 2000) (emphasis added).
96. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.24 (a)(2) (1999).
97. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1314 (c)(3) (1999).
98. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1314 (c)(4) (1999).
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missal of the suits previously filed by the cities of Atlanta, Detroit, New
Orleans, and Wayne County.
Georgia's immunity statute states that it applies "to any actions
pending on or brought on or after February 9, 1999. . . ."9 Shortly
after the law's enactment, several of the defendants in the Atlanta suit
(filed on February 4, 1999), filed a motion to dismiss based partly on
the immunity statute.' ° Although the court denied Defendants' mo-
tion in part, its opinion barely touched upon the statute, and did not
address directly the retroactivity of the immunity law.1 ' As of the end
of 2000, this issue was before the Georgia Supreme Court, and discov-
ery had been stayed pending a decision.'0 2
Louisiana's immunity statute is similar to the Georgia law in that
it explicitly provides for retroactive application: "The provisions of this
Act shall be applicable to all claims existing or actions pending on its
effective date and all claims arising or actions filed on and after its
effective date."' 0 ' Louisiana's immunity statute has also been tested in
court. On February 28, 2000, the civil district court in the City of New
Orleans' suit denied Defendants' Peremptory Exceptions of No Right
of Action and No Cause of Action (equivalent to a motion to dis-
miss),* ° 4 Unlike the Georgia decision, however, the court devoted al-
most half of its opinion to the (un)constitutionality of the retroactive
provision in Louisiana's immunity law.1 0 5 Notably, however, the court
did not address the prospective application of the law. On April 3,
2001, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed in part and vacated in
99. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184(b)(2) (1999).
100. See Smith & Wesson Corp.'s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss, at 3-
8, City of Atlanta v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99VS0149217J (Fulton County Ct.) (filed
Sept. 15, 1999).
101. In its October 27, 1999 order, the court stated in a footnote:
In reaching its decision, the Court did not find to be of merit Plaintiff's argument
that House Bill 189, approved in toto by Governor Barnes on Feb. 9, 1999, was
enacted as Amended O.C.G.A. § 16-11-184 excluding Section 3 of the same which
provides: "This act shall apply to any action pending on or brought on or after
the date this act becomes effective."
City of Atlanta, No. 99VS0149217J, at 2 n.2 (order dated Oct. 27, 1999).
102. See Glock, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, No. 1999CV16402 (Fulton County Ct.) (order
dated Apr. 12, 2000).
103. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1797.1 (West 2000).
104. See Morial v. Smith & Wesson, No. 98-18578 (Orleans Parish Dist. Ct.) (order dated
Feb. 28, 2000).
105. The court found three reasons supporting its conclusion that the Louisiana immu-
nity statute could not apply retroactively: (1) plaintiffs have a vested right to bring suit
under the City of New Orleans' home rule charter; (2) the retroactive provision of
§ 1797.1 is a prohibited special law; and (3) as a substantive law, § 1797.1 cannot be ap-
plied retroactively. See id. at 7. For a detailed discussion of this order and the retroactive
application of § 1797.1, see student note, this issue.
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part holding that Louisiana's immunity law could in fact be retroac-
tively applied to the City's suit. The Supreme Court found that the
law was enacted pursuant to a reasonable exercise of the state's police
power and its retroactive provision was not a constitutionally prohib-
ited local or special law.10 6
The Michigan immunity law took effect immediately when signed
by the Governor on June 29, 2000.' Regarding its applicability, the
statute provides: "[The immunity provisions] are intended only to
clarify the current status of the law in this state, are remedial in na-
ture, and, therefore, apply to a civil action pending on the effective
date of this act."'08 The wording of this provision may have been cho-
sen to thwart the kind of arguments raised by plaintiffs in the Atlanta
and New Orleans suits - that immunity legislation cannot be applied
retroactively to pending lawsuits."' On March 23, 2001, the Circuit
Court for the County of Wayne denied defendants' motion to dismiss
Detroit and Wayne County's suits based on the immunity legislation.
Specifically, the Court found that the retroactive language "is an un-
constitutional violation of separation of powers because the legislature
has in effect acted as the Court of Appeals and dictated what law
should be applied in a case presently pending before this court." The
Court also found that the retroactive application of the statute is un-
constitutional because it takes away a vested right to sue. The Court
explicitly held, however, that the immunity law could be applied pro-
spectively.110 Finally, although the Kentucky legislature intends that
its immunity statute has retroactive effect,"' no municipal cases have
yet been filed in that state and therefore the retroactivity issue will
never arise.
Given the mixed results to date, it is too early to definitively deter-
mine whether most immunity legislation will ultimately invalidate
pending lawsuits.
106. See Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 00-CA-1132 (La. Sup. Ct.) (order dated
April 3, 2001).
107. See 2000 Mich. Pub Acts 265.
108. See id.
109. See supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
110. On April 26, 1999, both Detroit and Wayne County filed suit against the gun indus-
try in two separate filings. See Complaint and Demand forJury Trial, Archer v. Arms Tech.,
Inc., No. 99912658 (Wayne County Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 26, 1999); Complaint and Demand
for Jury Trial, McNamara v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 9912662 (Wayne County Cir. Ct. filed
Apr. 26, 1999).
111. See H.B. 15, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2000).
20011
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
E. Other Notable Provisions
Several of the immunity statutes have particular provisions worth
noting. For example, both the Michigan and Colorado statutes grant
costs and attorney fees if civil actions have been filed in violation of
the immunity provisions.' 12 Texas and Alabama only permit munici-
pal suits with certain approval. In Texas, otherwise prohibited suits
may be brought "if the suit is approved in advance by the legislature in
a concurrent resolution" 3 or by enactment of a law." '14 Alabama, on
the other hand, vests any authority to sue with the Attorney General
upon consent of the Governor.1 15 Also in Texas, the attorney general
is expressly exempted from the immunity provisions.116 By compari-
son, in Virginia, "any state governmental entity, including a depart-
ment, agency, or authority" is expressly forbidden from suing in this
capacity,'" 7 and in Utah, even the state may not sue. 118
Finally, while no immunity legislation has been enacted in Wyo-
ming, a statute entitled, the "Second Amendment defense," gives au-
thority to the attorney general, with approval from the Governor, to
intervene or file an amicus curiae brief in lawsuits filed in Wyoming
against the gun industry or certain individuals in other jurisdictions "if
in his judgment, the action endangers the constitutional right of citi-
zens of Wyoming to keep and bear arms. " "'
112. See 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts § 15(9); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-504.5(3) (1999).
113. See The Texas Legislature Online (visited Nov. 13, 2000) <http://www.capitol.state.tx.
us/capitol/legproc/other.htm>. (Defining a concurrent resolution as:
A resolution is a legislative document used to express the collective will of the
members of the legislature or of either house... A concurrent resolution is used
when both houses have an interest in a particular matter. Such resolutions may
originate in either house but must be adopted by both. A concurrent resolution
passed by both houses may be used for matters affecting operations and proce-
dures of the legislature, such as joint sessions or adjournment sine die. Fre-
quently, concurrent resolutions are used to memorialize the U.S. Congress, give
directions to a state agency or officer, or express views of the legislature. Concur-
rent resolutions, except those that pertain solely to procedural matters between
the two houses, must be submitted to the governor for approval).
114. TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 128.001(c) (West 1999).
115. See H.B. 105, Reg. Sess. (Al. 2000).
116. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 128.001 (e) (West 1999).
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-915.1 (Michie 2000).
118. Se UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-64(2) (2000).
119. Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 9-14-101 (Michie 1999). Wyoming's Second Amendment de-
fense statute states in full:
The attorney general may seek to intervene or file an amicus curiae brief in any
lawsuit filed in any state or federal court in Wyoming, or filed against any Wyo-
ming citizen or firm in any other jurisdiction for damages for injuries as a result
of the use of fire arms that are not defective, if in his judgment, the action endan-
gers the constitutional right of citizens of Wyoming to keep and bear arms. The
attorney general is directed to advance arguments that protect the constitutional
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IV. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Other Recently Proposed Bills
During 2000, immunity legislation was under consideration in at
least four other states: Delaware, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Ver-
mont. 121 Vermont's proposed legislation not only prohibited munici-
palities from bringing suit against the gun industry, but the state was
also barred unless the general assembly approves the suit. 12' Massa-
chusetts' proposal is relatively simple and similar to many of the ear-
lier statutes.] 2 2
The proposed immunity bills in Ohio and Delaware, however,
were far more comprehensive. Ohio House Bill 498 gives extensive
protection to "a member of the firearm industry," which is broadly
defined, 12 and then lists certain circumstances under which this pro-
tection is forfeited or exempted. 124 Moreover, Ohio House Bill 498
explicitly states that the immunity legislation it proposes has both pro-
spective and retroactive application, 125 and therefore, if enacted,
threatens the lawsuits filed by the cities of Cleveland and Cincinnati.
Delaware's proposed immunity legislation, which is set forth in
House Bill 350, also provides extensive protection for members of the
gun industry.1 26 Interestingly, the bill expressly states that its purpose
is to thwart the use of "questionable legal theories" or municipal law-
suits designed to "extort money from members of the industry .... 27
right to bear arms. Before intervening in any lawsuit pursuant to this section, the
attorney general shall obtain the approval of the governor.
Id.
120. See The Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, Immunity Legislative Update (visited Aug.
1, 2000) <http://www.csgv.org/content/coalition/coal-immunity-update 07_08_00.
html>.
121. See H.B.155, 65th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1999); see also S.B. 32, 65th Biennial Sess. (Vt.
1999).
122. See An Act Relative to Manufacturer Protection, Docket No. 1872 (proposing to
amend Chapter 140 of the General Laws by inserting Section 131Q after section 131P).
123. See H.B. 498 § 1, 123d Gen. Assembly Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999-2000) (to be codified
at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.401(B)).
124. See H.B. 498 § 1, 123d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999-2000) (to be codified
at OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.401 (C) (1)). In addition to these forfeiture provisions,
House Bill 498 also exempts two civil actions from its immunity provisions: an action (1)
seeking damages for harm based on a product liability claim as defined elsewhere; and (2)
for a breach of an express warranty. H.B. 498 § 1, 123d Gen. Assembly Reg. Sess. (Ohio
1999-2000) (to be codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.401(C) (2), (3)).
125. See H.B. 498 § 2, 123d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999-2000). If the Ohio
Supreme Court deems the retroactive provision unconstitutional, however, that provision
is to be severed and the law given prospective application only. Id.
126. See H.B. 350, 104th Gen. Assembly (Del. 1999).
127. Id. The bill's synopsis provides in part:
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B. Possible Constitutional Issues
Municipalities are creations of the state. As such, it is well settled
that a municipality or other political subdivision of a state generally
may not raise federal constitutional challenges to laws limiting its pow-
ers enacted by its creating state.' 12  However, as has been described,
several of the state immunity laws apply to individual lawsuits as
well. 1 29 Private litigants in those states would certainly have standing
to challenge the constitutionality of the immunity laws. 30
One future challenge to the immunity legislation may derive
from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."'' The United States Supreme Court has held that, under cer-
tain circumstances, "a cause of action is a species of property pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."
' 3 2
Thus, by foreclosing the right to sue members of the gun industry,
Several large municipalities in other states have recently become involved in law
suits against members of the firearms industry based upon unique and sometimes
questionable legal theories for the apparent purpose of obtaining money dam-
ages which may then be used to finance medical and social programs in those
municipalities. If successful, such suits have the very real potential of severely
damaging or destroying the firearms industry in those states.... The purpose of
this Act is to ensure that any such suits brought by political subdivisions of the
State of Delaware undergo a review process to ensure that any such suits are, in
fact, meritorious and are not being brought simply for the purpose of harming
the legitimate firearms industry or extorting money from members of the
industry....
Id. See also Amiz. REv. STAT. § 12-714 (B) (1999) (demonstrating that Arizona's enacted
immunity statute specifically discusses the municipal lawsuits as well). New immunity bills
were also introduced in several state legislatures during the 2001 legislative session. See, e.g.
S.B. 218, 415th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2001).
128. See, e.g., Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907); City of Newark v. New
Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196 (1923).
129. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
130. See generally Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-62 (1992) (discussing
the elements necessary to satisfy the standing requirement).
131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
132. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982) (discussing Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)). See also Martinez v. California,
444 U.S. 277, 281-282 (1980) ("Arguably, the cause of action for wrongful death that the
State has created is a species of 'property' protected by the Due Process Clause."); Peter
Zablotsky, From a Whimper to a Bang: The Trend Toward Finding Occurrence Based Statutes of
Limitations Governing Negligent Misdiagnosis of Diseases with Long Latency Periods Unconstitu-
tional, 103 DICK. L. REv. 455, 485 (Spring, 1999) ("The procedural due process analysis
begins with the universally accepted premise that a cause of action is a species of property
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and that Due Process
Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts as plaintiffs attempting to
redress grievances.").
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individuals might argue that the state has deprived them of their
property in violation of due process.
State constitutions, moreover, often provide additional protec-
tions through due process, access to court, and right to remedy provi-
sions."'33 Louisiana's constitution, for example, provides: "All courts
shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due
process of law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or
unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property, reputa-
tion, or other rights."' 34 The Texas constitution grants similar protec-
tion: "All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done
him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law."' 35 Indeed, of the nineteen states with immunity
legislation, at least fifteen of their state constitutions have such provi-
sions.'36 Therefore, the scope of due process protection or whether it
applies at all, may depend upon the state in which the suit was
brought.
Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment also forbids a state to
"deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. ,' 3 7 It might be argued that singling out one industry for protec-
tion from liability would deny a plaintiff the opportunity to sue simply
because his or her injuries were caused by a firearm, where a plaintiff
with similar injuries caused by some other product (say, a carpenter's
nail gun) would not be so barred.
In the past, however, Congress has chosen to provide protection
to certain industries that others do not enjoy. For example, in 1994,
Congress enacted the General Aviation Revitalization Act.'33 The Act
imposes an eighteen-year statute of repose for product liability suits
against manufacturers of certain small planes. 13  No court has ad-
dressed whether the Act presents any equal protection problems.
133. See Zablotsky, supra note 132, at 478.
134. LA. CONST. art I, § 22.
135. TEX. CONsr. art. 1, § 13.
136. See ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 13; ARiz. CONST. art. 18, § 6; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 13;
CoLo. CONsT. art. II, § 6; GA. CONST. art. I §, 1; Ky. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 14; LA. CONST.
art. I, § 22; ME. CONST. art 1, § 19; Mor. CONST. art. II, § 16; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6; PA.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 11; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 20; TENN. CONST. art I, § 17; TEX. CONST. art. I,
§ 13; UTAH CONsT. art. 1, § 11. See also Zablotsky, supra note 132, at 486-87.
137. U.S. CONsT. amend. XlV, § 1.
138. General Aviation Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994).
139. See id. Of course, unlike firearms, numerous standards regulate the safe design of
these aircraft. See 14 CFR § 21.1 et seq.
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However, the constitutionality of other so-called "tort reform" laws has
generally been analyzed on a mere rational basis standard.
141
V. CONCLUSION
In general, if litigation is to serve a public health purpose, the
courthouse doors must remain open. Firearm immunity laws attempt
to close those doors. For a number of reasons discussed in this article,
however, the inhibatory effects of the immunity laws may be miti-
gated. In many of the states that have enacted these laws, certain
causes of action are still available even to municipal plaintiffs. In
others, attempts to retroactively apply an immunity law to pending
suits have thus far met with mixed success.
Of course, it is also important to recall that the majority of states
have not enacted an immunity law at all. And as an intervention, liti-
gation is fundamentally different from legislation. For gun control
legislation to be successful, a national approach may be required. But
litigation has the potential to dramatically affect an industry even if it is
only implemented in a few receptive states. For example, the major
gun manufacturer Smith & Wesson recently agreed to change the way
it manufacturers and markets its products in exchange for being dis-
missed from most (but not all) of the municipal lawsuits-before a
single one had even approached trial.' 4 '
For now, then, even in many states with immunity laws, the court-
house door remains at least ajar. And in many other states, litigation
by both individuals and municipalities continues to be among the
most active areas of the gun policy arena.
140. See generally, Perry H. Applebaum & Samara T. Ryder, The Third Wave of Federal Tort
Reform: Protecting the Public or Pushing the Constitutional Envelope?, 8 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 591 (1999).
141. SeeJames Dao, Commercials By Gun Industry Will Ty to Counter Litigation, N.Y TIMES,
July 28, 2000, at A16.
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